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Abstract
This study examines the impact of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing on the Aus-
tralian theatrical film industry. Using a large data set of torrent downloads observed
on three popular P2P networks, we find evidence of a sales displacement effect on
box office revenues. However, although statistically significant, the economic signif-
icance of this displacement appears relatively small. To establish causality, we make
use of two precedent-setting Australian Federal Court case rulings, as well as ob-
served levels of contemporaneous downloading in geographically separated markets
within Australia. We observe that the release gap between the US and Australian
markets is a key contributor to piracy early in a film’s theatrical life; this finding
provides a partial explanation for the industry’s move toward coordinated worldwide
releases.
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1 Introduction
Since the arrival of file-sharing technologies more than a decade ago, intellectual prop-
erty protection has become an increasingly topical and important issue because digital
technologies have provided consumers low-cost means with which to share copyrighted
material. Indeed the global music, software, television and film industries claim to be
facing the most significant single threat to their profits and very survival in history as a
direct result of digital piracy. With the proliferation of BitTorrent and other file-sharing
technologies, internet users can easily download content at close to zero cost given that
they have a high-speed internet connection and sufficient download capacity. The in-
creasing popularity of such services has created something of a revolution in the way
many consumers access and consume content. As a result, content providers have waged
an international ‘war on piracy’ in many countries, with high-profile legal cases against
file-sharing services, individuals using file-sharing services, and internet service providers
(ISPs).
Although it is extremely difficult to put a figure on the extent and costs of digital
piracy, a recent annual industry survey by Business Software Alliance of 15,000 computer
users across 33 countries found that more than 57% of respondents admitted to pirating
software in 2012, up from 42% in 2011. Another recent study of piracy habits in the US
found that 46% of adults have bought, copied, or downloaded unauthorised music, TV
shows or films and that these practices correlate strongly with youth and moderately with
higher incomes.1 In Europe, a 2010 study by the International Chamber of Commerce
found that internet pirates downloaded C= 10 billion worth of music, film and television
and claimed that digital piracy could cost the content industries C= 240 billion in revenue
and 1.2 million jobs by 2015.
The content industries would appear unambiguously of the opinion that piracy has
only negative consequences for their stake-holders. However, many academics and in-
dustry observers have noted that piracy may have beneficial effects too if, for example,
illegal downloading acts as a sample which precedes legal paid consumption, or if there are
bandwagon effects in demand from shared word-of-mouth. Economic theory can predict
either a positive or negative legal consumption effect from piracy.2 Which effect is larger
is an empirical issue. As Dejean (2009) and Waldfogel (2012) discuss in detail, three
broad approaches have been pursued in the empirical literature investigating the effects
of digital piracy on legal paid consumption. First, a number of studies have examined
aggregate sales vis-a`-vis internet usage, or computer ownership, as a proxy for download-
ing activity. These studies typically pursue either a cross-sectional approach (e.g. Peitz
and Waelbroeck, 2004; Zentner, 2005; Walls, 2008), a time-series approach (e.g. Ste-
vans and Sessions, 2005), or a combination thereof (e.g. Michel, 2006; Liebowitz, 2008).
Second, some studies have utilised actual download information (e.g. Liebowtiz, 2006;
Bhattacharjee et al, 2007; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007; De Vany and Walls, 2007).
Third, others have based analyses on data obtained by surveying individuals on their con-
sumption behaviour (e.g. Zentner, 2006; Rob and Waldfogel, 2006, 2007; Hennig-Thurau,
1Copy Culture in the US and Germany, The American Assembly, 2011.
2Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) provide a useful survey on the theoretical contributions related to digital
piracy.
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Henning and Sattler, 2007; Waldfogel, 2010).
Conceptually, the best approach would appear to be the second one, where actual
downloading activity is measured directly and related to legitimate sales. However, this
approach is complicated by the inherent simultaneity between sales and downloads. A
particularly impressive study employing data on actual downloads vis-a`-vis sales is that of
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007). That study of the US recorded music industry used
file-sharing data collected from OpenNap, a centralised peer-to-peer (P2P) network, pro-
viding a sample capturing 0.01% of the world’s downloads, and contemporaneous album
sales (retail and on-line) over a 17 week period in late 2002. To mitigate the endogeneity
between sales and downloads, they considered the number of German school children on
holiday under the assumption that German kids provided much of the supply of songs
on file-sharing networks. However, they were unable to detect any displacement effect
between download activity and music sales concluding that the observed decline in music
sales is not the primary result of file-sharing.3
Our study similarly investigates digital piracy using actual download and sales data,
but with specific application to the theatrical film industry. We employ an extensive data
set of daily Australian state/territory level P2P torrent downloads and contemporaneous
box office revenues. Our study is the first that we know of to consider digital piracy in
the film industry using a large data set of actual downloading activity. Our empirical
methodology is in many respects similar to the approach of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf;
however, as discussed further below, there are a number of subtle and important differ-
ences. In particular, our identification strategy uses precedent-setting Australian Federal
Court decisions in which Australia’s second largest internet service provider (ISP), iiNet,
was twice ruled to be non-complicit in digital piracy by failing to disconnect customers
identified by copyright holders—represented by the the Australian Federation Against
Copyright Theft (AFACT)—as having downloaded illegal content. In addition to the
judgements of these court rulings, we also use the summed number of downloads in other
geographic markets (i.e. states/territories) in our identification strategy—an approach
similar to the use of (average) price in other markets often employed in the differentiated
goods literature when estimating demand (e.g. Nevo, 2001).
Like Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, we find no evidence of a contemporaneous relation-
ship between downloading and sales (i.e. box office revenues), but we do find evidence of a
sales displacement effect when downloads are considered as a dynamic stock over one, two,
three and four week windows. We also observe that both contemporaneous and dynamic
stock downloads have a significant negative impact on first week box office. Given many
films are subject to a release lag between the US and Australian markets, this suggests
downloading activity post-US release but pre-Australian release decreases opening week
revenues which are well-known to be particularly important in a film’s life.4 We find that
3Although appearing as the lead article in the Journal of Political Economy, and having been one
of the most downloaded and cited papers in the journal since its publication, the findings have not
been accepted without criticism. Notably, Liebowitz (2007, 2010) questions the data construction and
instruments used in the econometric component of the research.
4This evidence is consistent with a recent study by Danaher and Waldfogel (2012) who find that, on
average, international box office revenues are 7% lower when international releases are delayed relative
to the US market in a study of seventeen countries pre and post BitTorrent technology.
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the release delay between the US and Australian markets provides an opportunistic win-
dow for online pirates which is statistically related to decreased revenues at the box office.
Although the present impact on box office revenues appears small, with the increasing
use of file-sharing technology and increased speed of bandwith in Australia, this problem
is likely to increase. The trend towards day-and-date releases seems the most sensible
response given this increasing threat in the absence of legal solutions.
2 Australian Context and the iiNet Case
Australia provides an interesting context within which to study digital piracy—and in
particular that related to theatrical films. Australians are well-known to be some of
the most frequent cinema-goers worldwide. According to statistics compiled by Screen
Australia, in 2010 Australia ranked third behind Iceland and Singapore in terms of annual
admissions per capita, with the US ranking fourth.5 It is widely known that Australians
are also some of the most avid users of P2P file-sharing technologies for music, television
and film.6 Australia’s attraction to file-sharing is often attributed to the relatively high
prices faces by consumers as well as international release delays.7 Two recent (2011)
studies by Australian Content Industry Group (ACIG) and Australian Federation Against
Copyright Theft (AFACT) estimate annual losses at A$900m and A$1.37b, respectively.8
With the National Broadband Network (NBN) progressively rolled-out over the next
decade, content industries fear that digital piracy will proliferate even further as consumers
are able to access and download illegal content with increasing speed and ease.
Although Australian content providers have been lobbying the government to take a
stand against piracy, thus far their efforts have largely been ignored with policy makers
encouraging continued negotiations with ISPs to find a cooperative solution.9 As a re-
sult of political inaction, some content owners have pursued direct legal action against
individuals and, subsequently, ISPs in their war on piracy. The initial legal strategy
pursued by some companies involved actions previously employed in the US (and other
countries) by sending Australian ISPs ‘cease and desist’ notices outlining details of the
customer’s infringement and requesting they threaten the individual with disconnection
of their internet service.10 However, not all ISPs complied with such instruction and the
failure to comply by Australia’s second largest ISP, iiNet, resulted in a landmark court
5See http://www.screenaustralia.com.au/research/statistics/acompadmitper.asp.
6For example, the HBO hit Game of Thrones was most heavily downloaded by Australians (Ernesto,
2012). In relation to music downloads, a recent study by MusicMetric found that Australians download
more songs per-capita than any other country and ranked sixth overall in terms of volume (Zuel, 2012).
7The disparity in prices for digital content has recently caught the attention of policy makers who
have commenced an inquiry within the Australian House of Representatives about the issue.
8To put these figures in perspective, total Australian box office revenue in 2011 was A$1.09b, a drop
of 3% over 2010’s record of A$1.13b (Motion Pictures Distributors Association of Australia, 2012).
9The ‘three-strikes’ policy adopted in a number of countries (e.g. UK and France) was considered in
Australia; however, to date, such a policy has found little support from policy makers.
10For example, the US television network CBS sent infringement notices to one Australian ISP, TPG,
in relation to alleged offences by their subscribers warning them “1) Remove or disable access to the
individual who has engaged in the conduct; and 2) Take appropriate action against the individual under
your Abuse of Policy Terms of Service Agreement” (Britton, 2011).
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case spanning more than four years.
In November 2008, a consortium of 34 record labels, pay-TV providers, film studios and
other content providers filed the case against iiNet for failing to discipline its customers
in relation to allegations of copyright infringement. The case of Roadshow Films and
others v iiNet (or commonly AFACT v iiNet) was initially heard by the Federal Court of
Australia and decided on 4 February 2010 with the trial judge ruling in favour of iiNet
and awarding costs. In passing judgement, the trial judge noted that while iiNet users
did infringe copyright, it was not the responsibility of iiNet to police its customers on
the infringement of other parties’ copyrights. The decision was subsequently appealed by
AFACT to the full bench (Full Court) of the Federal Court on 24 February 2011 but was
again dismissed by the presiding judges. The trial judges upheld the initial decision but
for different reasons. They noted that although iiNet showed an indifferent attitude to
the complainants’ allegations, iiNet’s inaction did not constitute authorisation for the act
of copyright infringement. On further appeal, the case was heard by the High (Supreme)
Court of Australia which again sided with iiNet in judgement passed on 20 April 2012.
The Court unanimously dismissed AFACT’s appeal and ordered AFACT to pay costs of
approximately A$9m.11 We make use of the first two rulings in our empirical exercise as
detailed below.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To investigate the impact of file-sharing on film revenues, we employ an extensive data
set of Australian state/territory level daily box office revenues and P2P torrent down-
loads of 166 films released in Australian cinemas between January 2010 and August 2011.
The films in our sample are typically large budget ‘Hollywood-type’ films which received a
wide-release in the US theatrical market as well as an Australian theatrical release. Given
the international nature of these films, a priori we would expect substantial interest in
both cinematic consumption and illegal downloading allowing us to investigate potential
displacement relationships between downloading activity and box office revenues. The
torrent data were sourced from Peer Media Technology—a company which, among other
services, measures digital piracy for companies in the entertainment, software and pub-
lishing industries. This service tracks downloads on three popular P2P networks: 1)
BitTorrent, 2) eDonkey, and 3) Ares, where a download is defined as a unique instance
of an IP address attempting to download an appropriately named file on a given day.
The IP addresses are subsequently geo-located by another company, MaxMind, to pro-
vide state/territory level number of downloads per title per day in our particular context.
Peer Media Technology estimates that their measurement provides approximately 55% of
all downloads in the Australian context.
The torrent data of each film in our study span a longer period than the observed
Australian theatrical life of the film, allowing us to track downloads which may have
occurred both before and after the theatrical window. In particular, we observe downloads
post US release, but pre-Australian release. Figure 1 reveals that the number of downloads
spikes after the initial US release, presumably the result of increased availability and
11See http://www.iinet.net.au/about/mediacentre/releases/index.html
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interest. But a significant number of downloads occurs prior to the Australian release
and we hypothesize that this is related to release gaps between the two markets, and
issue we shall discuss in more detail below. During the theatrical release window, we
observe contemporaneous (daily) box office revenues and number of theatres for each film
disaggregated to the state/territory level (Rentrak). In addition, we also observe US box
office revenues, opening theatres and cinematic release dates, hence we observe the release
gap between the US and Australian theatrical releases.12
In total we observe 295,304 torrent download data points and 64,328 daily box office
revenue and theatre data points. We limit our attention to 20 weeks of box office revenues
post Australian release which provides us 56,663 data points in the final estimation sample.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide summary statistics for our data. Table 1 details aggregate level
information for the 166 films observed. On average, each film earned nearly A$8.9m at
the Australian box office and was released on 259 screens. The highest earning film,
Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows Part 2, made almost A$51m. The average number
of downloads per title was almost 113,000, with an average file-size of 1.2GB. The most
downloaded film, Inception, was downloaded more than 435,000 times. As noted above,
all the films in our sample had a wide-release in the US market of at least 2,000 theatres
(average of 3,125), and were generally large budget titles with an average (estimated)
production budget of US$70m (data sourced from IMDb).
Table 2 provides further film-level summary statistics in relation to revenue and down-
loads. In terms of mean and median, there is some evidence that ‘Action’ films are popular
with both cinema attendees and downloaders. However, while G (general admission) and
PG (parental guidance) rated films are more popular with cinema goers; M (mature)
and MA15+ (mature audiences 15 years and over) rated films are more popular with
downloaders. Of all 166 films we observe, the correlation between total revenue and total
downloads is moderately strong at 0.522. Figure 2 shows this relation with a simple linear
regression which reveals a statistically significant positive relation.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the disaggregated data used in estimation. Of
the 56,663 data points, the average film’s daily (state/territory level) revenue is A$25,148
and the average number of downloads is 95. These are simply weighted averages of the
state/territory data contained in the body of the table. The state/territory summary
data is consistent with respective sate/territory populations in terms of mean ranking.13
However, the data for Northern Territory (NT) downloads are particularly low due to
problems in primary data collection.14 Aggregating all revenue and downloads across
states/territories for all films observed on each of the 596 days in our sample, the average
Australia-wide daily revenue was just under A$2.5m, with the highest recorded single day
revenue of A$9.4m occurring on Wednesday July 13, 2011, coinciding with the release
of Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows. In terms of downloads, nation-wide the daily
average was just over 31,000 with the highest single day number of downloads occurring
12All of the theatrical market data on films were obtained from Rentrak.
13In December 2011, New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria (VIC) were the largest states with pop-
ulations of 7.25 million (approximately 32% of Australia’s population) and 5.57 million (approximately
25%), respectively. Tasmania (TAS), Australian Capital Territory (ACT), and Northern Territory (NT)
are the smallest in terms of population with 0.51 million, 0.37 million and 0.23 million, respectively.
14All estimates were re-calculated omitting this territory; there were no qualitative changes to results.
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on Sunday June 12, 2011, where more than 61,700 downloads occurred. Our data also
displays intra-week seasonality in relation to both revenue and downloads. Unsurprisingly
Saturday, Sundays and Friday recorded highest average nation-wide revenues (downloads)
at A$4.0m (35,296), A$3.3m (34,863), and A$2.7 (28,424), respectively. We control for
the intra-week seasonality in our model with the use of day-of-week dummy variables as
discussed in the following section.
4 Econometric Model
Contemporaneous Downloads
The empirical model quantifies the sales displacement effect from illegal P2P torrent
downloads on box office revenue. The approach is similar to Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
(2007), with a number of important differences. First, our context is theatrical film rev-
enues rather than music sales. This removes the complicated issue of transforming single
downloads (sales) to a proxy for album downloads (sales). Second, the data are observed
at daily, rather than weekly, levels. Also, data points are observed at the state/territory
level, rather than national level. And third, our instruments for downloads in each mar-
ket relies on judgements handed down in the Federal Court of Australia, as well as the
contemporaneous downloading activity in the other state/territory geographical markets
we observe. We discuss identification in more detail below.
Because films that are more popular at the box office are also more likely to be illegally
downloaded, download activity should be treated as endogenous. We employ a two-
step efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation approach with robust
standard errors (Hansen, 1982).15 Our contemporaneous downloads model is defined in
equations (1a) and (1b) which, respectively, represent the first stage and second stage of
the GMM estimation
lnDist = α0 + α1FC
1
t + α2FC
2
t + α3 lnDis′t + α4 lnTHist (1a)
+α5WKist + αdDW
d + ηDs + v
D
i + εist
lnRist = β0 + β1 ln D̂ist + β2 lnTHist + β3WKist + βdDW
d + ηRs + v
R
i + µist (1b)
15Define the general form of equation (1) as y = Xβ + u, where the matrix of regressors, X, is of
dimensions N × k, and where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Also
define the covariance matrix of u as E[uu′|X] = Ω, which is of dimension N ×N . As some regressors (i.e.
downloads) are endogenous, partition the regressors {x1x2} with the k1 regressors x1 endogenous and the
(k−k1) remaining regressors x2 assumed to be exogenous. The matrix of instrumental variables Z is N×l,
where the instruments are partitioned into {z1z2}, where the l1 instruments z1 are excluded instruments
and the remaining (l−l1) instrument z2 ≡ x2 are the included instruments (or exogenous regressors). The
l instruments give a set of moment conditions, E[zu] = 0, with the sample analogue g(β) = (1/N)Z′u.
The intuition is to select a estimator for β which solves g(βˆGMM ) = 0. The GMM estimator chooses βˆ
that minimises the GMM objective function J(βˆ) = Ng(βˆ)′Wg(βˆ), where W is an l× l weighting matrix.
The optimal weighting matrix is that which produces the most efficient estimates. Following Hansen
(1982), W = S−1, where S is the covariance matrix of the moment conditions S = E[Z′ΩZ]. For the
heteroskedastic-consistent estimate of S, Sˆ = (1/N)ΣNi=1uˆ
2
iZ
′
iZi is used. The residuals come from a 2SLS
regression which provides consistent estimates of β.
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where Rist and Dist define revenue and downloads of film i in state s on date t,
respectively. Our first instruments, FC1t and FC
2
t are dummy variables that takes the
value 0 for dates prior to 4 February 2010 and 24 February 2011, respectively, and take the
value 1 after these dates. Our second instrument, Dis′t, represents the sum of downloads
of film i in all other states/territories s′ 6= s on date t. THist is the (time-variant) number
of theatres showing film i in state s on date t. WKist is the week of the run of film i in
state s on date t. DW d represents a vector of dummy variables for day-of-week effects,
ηs are state/territory fixed-effects, and vi are film fixed-effects (with superscripts D and
R denoting the first (downloads) and second (revenue) equations). Finally, εist and µist
are first and second stage errors, respectively.
The logarithm transformation is applied to revenue and download data since both
distributions are bounded below at zero and are skewed to the right. An additional benefit
of the log-transformation is that the impact of downloads on revenues can be interpreted
as an elasticity. Daily theatres, which are also transformed into logarithms, provide a
time-variant measure of supply which allows demand to be realised on any given day. We
would expect this variable to be positively related to revenues. The week-of-run variable
captures the well-known typical decreasing relationship with time most films experience
after they open. Given the left hand side revenue variable is in logarithmic form, the
linearity of the week variable in fact would give rise to a convex relationship between
revenue and time which is typically observed in box office (De Vany and Walls, 1997).
Day-of-week dummy variables control for intra-week patterns in demand which typically
reveal spikes on weekends and Tuesdays, which is a discount day for most cinemas in
Australia (see De Roos and McKenzie, 2012). Finally, fixed-effects are also included for
state/territory and film. As discussed further below, the inclusion of films fixed-effects
goes some way to purging the simultaneity between revenue and downloads.
Identification
Identification in our model derives from the inclusion of two dummy variables for the Fed-
eral Court and Full Court of the Federal Court’s decisions against AFACT on 4 February
2010 and 24 February 2011, respectively, as well as the sum of downloads observed across
all other states/territories s′ 6= s, which are contemporaneous to the number of downloads
in state s on the particular day of observation.
Regarding the first instruments, it is possible that the decisions against AFACT could
have either a positive or negative effect on downloading behaviour. On one hand, it could
be argued that the media attention to the case sent a signal that the content industries
were serious about pursuing legal recourse against those who infringed their copyrights—
even though the judgements were against them. On the other hand, the negative outcomes
might have signalled that individuals would not likely be punished by their ISPs and this
increased downloading activity after the judgements.
Regarding the second instrument, the use of downloads in other geographic markets
is similar in approach to the use of (average) price in other markets as an instrument
for price in modelling demand in a focal market as common in the differentiated goods
literature (e.g. Nevo, 2001). The intuition is that prices are correlated through common
marginal cost shocks. Assuming the errors in demand are independent across market, this
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‘cost shifter’ approach is valid.
While it it is obvious that the Federal Court’s decisions are exogenous events which
satisfy the statistical requirements to be valid instruments, it is less clear that the second
instrument relating to the contemporaneous levels of downloads in other markets satisfies
the same requirement. However, there are at least three strong arguments to support
this instrument as valid in our context. Firstly, downloading activity in other states is
almost certainly unlikely to affect theatre attendance (i.e. box office revenue) in the state
of interest. Given the geographical locations of major cities and centres within Australian
states, it would be a very small number of people who would potentially reside (and
download) in one state but attend theatres in another state. Secondly, the number of
downloaders present in a ‘swarm’ (i.e. the combined number of ‘seeders’ and ‘peers’ who
possess a full copy or part copy of the file, respectively) plays an important role with
downloading ability and speed. Ceteris paribus, the more active downloaders in a swarm,
the higher the success rate and speed of download, or the lower the opportunity cost
of downloading. Thirdly, any problems with downloading a particular title are likely to
affect all downloaders regardless of their geographical location. For example, if a ‘tracker’
(i.e. the server which directs the torrent uploads and downloads) goes down, this will
affect the number of downloads nation-wide assuming they are on the same P2P network.
Dynamic Stock of Downloads
Although the model described in (1) captures the potential sales displacement for film
i, in market s, on date t; for a number of reasons it would seem more appropriate to
consider the number of downloads over some window of time prior to, and including, date
t for that particular film rather than only those downloads observed contemporaneously.
For example, illegal downloaders may browse torrent sites for new titles and may ini-
tialise a download with the intent of viewing the download at a later time. In addition,
downloading speeds (at least during the period of analysis in Australia) could be restric-
tively slow preventing instant playback necessitating files are downloaded in advance of
actual consumption. Further, there is also the possibility that once a download has been
completed, an individual may share the file with friends which would similarly contribute
to potential future sales displacement effects. For these reason, we therefore consider it
likely that downloading over some window of time affects future box office sales which
would not be captured in our contemporaneous specification. We subsequently refer to
this alternate approach as a dynamic stock of downloads in our empirical methodology
and consider the modified model:
lnDisT = α0 + α1FC
1
t + α2FC
2
t + α3 lnDis′T + α4 lnTHist (2a)
+α5WKist + αdDW
d + ηDs + v
D
i + εist
lnRist = β0 + β1 ln D̂isT + β2 lnTHist + β3WKist + βdDW
d + ηRs + v
R
i + µist (2b)
where DisT defines downloads of film i in state s over a period of T days, where T ∈
{7, 14, 21, 28}, prior to and including the date of observation. This specification would nest
the contemporaneous model when T = 1. Essentially, the modification simply considers
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the dynamic stock of downloads over one, two, three or four weeks (T = 7, 14, 21, 28)
prior to (and including) date t. Our instrument, Dis′T , is also similarly defined and now
represents downloads of film i in all other states/territories s′ 6= s over T . All other
variables remain as specified above.
5 Estimation Results
Contemporaneous Downloads
Table 4 provides regression results for the base model where downloads are treated con-
temporaneously to revenue on the date of observation. The first column reports robust
OLS estimates without film fixed-effects. The coefficient on the key variable of interest,
contemporaneous downloads (Dist), is positive and significantly different from zero at 1%.
The other estimated coefficients conform with a-priori expectations. Specifically, week-of-
run (WKist) and contemporaneous theatres (THist) reveal negative and positive signage,
respectively. Again, both are statistically significant. Inclusion of film fixed-effects in the
second column of Table 4 purges some of the endogeneity between revenue and downloads
that exists because of unobservable shared tastes for more popular films. Notably, the
estimated coefficient on contemporaneous downloads is reduced but is still significantly
positive. The third and fourth columns represent the first and second stage GMM regres-
sions defined in equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. The first stage estimates reveal a
strong and significant positive relation with the excluded variables, FC2t and Dis′t, and
a significant negative relation with FC1t . Using the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM test for
under-identification, Cragg and Donald (1993) test for weak identification, and the Hansen
J test for over-identification (as discussed by Hayashi, 2000) we find our instruments to
be statistically validated.
The second stage results of the GMM estimation reveal a further decrease in the
magnitude of the estimated coefficient on contemporaneous downloads. The positive
relation between downloading activity and revenues is still apparent and significant, but
the magnitude of the effect has been substantially reduced. This further supports that
the excluded variables (instruments) are serving the model well by reducing the positive
bias induced by the endogeneity of downloads. The other estimated coefficients in the
second stage are similar in magnitude and signage to the robust OLS results of column 2.
Time-invariant and film-specific variables—such as budget, cast/director appeal, (pre-
release) advertising, genre, classification rating, etc—are implicitly captured in our model
by the inclusion of film fixed-effects. To examine the contributions of some of these vari-
ables, we extract individual film fixed-effects and consider them against the time-invariant
film-specific variables observed in our data set. The correlation between budget and the
extracted fixed-effects is 0.50 (compared to a correlation of 0.65 with total film revenues);
and the correlation between (national) opening week screens and fixed-effects is 0.72 (com-
pared to a correlation of 0.82 with total film revenues). In a basic OLS regression with
fixed-effects as the dependent variable, estimated coefficients of both (log) budget and
(log) opening screens are positive and significant at the 1% level of significance with an
R2=0.44. Both relationships still hold at 1% when controls are added for the categor-
ical variables of sequel, genre, and classification rating with R2=0.64. In comparison,
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a regression of (log) total revenue on the same set of covariates found similar explana-
tory evidence in terms of signage and significance with R2=0.81. To the extent that the
extracted fixed-effects correlate strongly with key variables, which have been shown as
important attributes of overall film success, these findings validate the use of film fixed-
effects as serving the model to capture the time-invariant determinants of demand for the
films we observe.16
Dynamic Stock of Downloads
As discussed in Section 4, we consider it likely that individuals make theatre attendance
decisions after a download decision. Under this assumption, it would be more appropriate
to consider the number of downloads over some window of time prior to the actual date
at which box office is observed. Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence when this window of
time is considered at one, two, three and four weeks prior to (and including) the date of
observation. Again we report the base models with and without film fixed-effects as well
as the GMM estimates. In all four models, T=7,14,21,28, it is evident that the coefficient
of (log) downloads reduces with the inclusion of fixed-effects and is further reduced with
the two step GMM estimation approach (as also observed within the contemporaneous
results reported in Table 4). However, unlike the contemporaneous case, the relationship
between downloads and revenues is observed to be statistically negative implying a sales
displacement effect. The (absolute) increasing magnitude of the download coefficient over
the four models, T=7,14,21,28, is a simple manifestation of the increasing dynamic stock.
The estimated coefficient suggests a sales displacement elasticity in the range 0.06-0.3.
We discuss the economic interpretation of these results further below.
6 Discussion of Estimation Results
Instruments and Identification
Correct causal inference depends critically on the model being correctly specified. In
modelling a potential sales displacement effect, the inherent difficulty lies in purging the
simulataneity between downloads and revenues which manifests in a positive bias on the
estimated coefficient in the absence of remedial measures. Fixed-effects provide a par-
tial solution, but correct identification requires a strong instrumental variable. We argue
that our instruments are particularly strong and satisfy both economic and statistical re-
quirements. Intuitively, the decisions of the Federal and Full Court of the Federal Court
provide an exogenous variable which would impact downloaders behaviours given the con-
siderable media attention paid to each judgement. As argued above, however, it is not
a-priori clear whether the rulings against AFACT would increase or decrease downloading
behaviour. From the first stage results, the initial judgement appears to have decreased
levels of downloading—perhaps the result of a signal sent that copyright holders were seri-
ous in their intent to pursue legal recourse (although obviously not achieving their desired
16A growing literature of empirical research has examined the correlates of financially successful films
such as budgets, advertising and publicity expenditures, opening screens/theatres, marquee stars, critical
reviews, awards, prequels/sequels, genre, rating, etc. See survey of McKenzie (2012) for examples.
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outcome). The results relating to the second judgement, however, suggests an increase in
downloading which might reflect a reduction in the perceived legal consequences of the
activity.
Regarding the second class of instrument, the case was made that downloading activity
in other states would be unlikely to affect box office sales in a focal state. The fact
downloading is subject to consumption externalities implies that, with an increase in
other downloaders, users face lower costs the more a particular file is being downloaded.
In addition, costs are also increased for all users when faced with a common adverse
shock—for example, a tracker going down. For these reasons, it is appropriated to assume
that cost of downloading is inversely correlated with the number of number of downloaders
actively downloading a particular title. We would therefore expect a positive correlation
between downloads between states on a particular day which is observed.
The results of the first stage regressions reveal a particularly high R2 which indicates
high explanatory power of the (included and excluded) instruments. However, there
may be concern that the correlation is too high in the sense that the first stage is just
recovering the endogenous variable. This would certainly be true if there was a very
high correlation between downloads in the focal market and other states. However, a
simple regressions of logDisT on logDis′T for T=1,7,14,28 reveal R
2 in the range 0.22-
0.34. In terms of simple correlations, the range is 0.47-0.58 between the endogenous
(log) download variable and respective (log) downloads in other states. It is apparent
that even though there is reasonably strong correlation between the endogenous variable
and the instrument—the statistical requirement—it is far from simply recovering itself
and the other instruments play an important role. As well, in terms of the statistical
requirement that the instrument is uncorrelated with revenues, the condition appears to
be well satisfied with simple correlation in the range -0.11 to 0.08. More formally, it was
also observed that the statistical tests rejected under, weak and over identification.
Opening Week Revenues and Release Delay
One potential criticism of our model is that we are observing daily film revenues over the
theatrical life of a film, which would typically be decreasing, whereas the dynamic stock
variable may be increasing. Although we include a week-trend variable in both the first
and second stage regressions, this potentially inverse relation may be driving the results.
Indeed, the first stage regression results of Tables 4, 5 and 6 suggest that downloads are
in fact positively related to the week of run variable WKist. To address this potential
issue, we restrict the model described in equations (2a) and (2b) to only model revenues
of films in their opening week of theatrical release. This means the variable WKist is now
redundant as all films are observed in their first week of release. Table 7 provides results
for the second stage regressions for the contemporaneous and dynamic models. In all
cases the coefficient on the downloads variable is statistically less than zero implying that
first week revenues are subject to a sales displacement effect. As illustrated graphically
in Figure 1, the fact that many films are subject to a release delay between the US and
Australian markets seems a logical explanation of the decreased first week sales when there
12
is an opportunity for download prior to the opportunity for legal consumption.17 In our
sample of 166 films, the average release gap between the US and Australian markets was
28 days (median of 13 days). One film, Thor, was released in Australia two weeks prior
to the US release, a further six films were released in Australian cinemas one week prior
to the US release, and 50 films had a simultaneous release with the US release (opening
within one day of the US release). The remainder of films had a positive release gap
with the greatest gap being Diary of a Wimpy Kid which opened in Australia cinemas
six months after its US release.
A simple regression of (log) downloads (observed within the first week) on observation
date relative to the US release (controlling for day-of-week, state and film), retrieved a
significant positive relation suggesting an increase in the number of first week downloads
the more time elapsed since the US release, ceteris paribus. Given that illegal copies of
films typically show up after the US release, this evidence is supportive of the release delay
between the US and Australian markets providing opportunities for illegal consumption
before the film is theatrically released in Australia. When release delays between the
US and Australian markets are significant, the likelihood of high quality torrents files
appearing on networks increases and increased levels of downloading would displace more
sales.
Weekly Model
The model outlined in Section 4 was estimated with daily data. To examine whether this
feature of our data has any bearing on results we also consider a model where revenue and
downloads are considered at the week level, rather than daily. We do this both for the
contemporaneous and dynamic stock models. The contemporaneous model is analogous
to (1a) and (1b) but now the time subscript t represents a week, rather than a day,
and is redefined tW . The theatres variable, THist, is redefined so it now represent the
maximum number of theatres screening on any day of that week for the film of interest.
Also, the day-of-week dummy variables are now redundant. The dynamic stock model
is similarly redefined in terms of weeks as TW , where TW now represents the number of
weeks included prior to week tW . We consider the dynamic horizons TW=1,2,3,4 implying
that downloads are observed for one, two, three and four weeks prior to, and including,
week tW .
Results for the weekly model are reported in Table 8 which display second stage regres-
sion results for the contemporaneous and dynamic stock models. In the contemporaneous
and TW=1 model, a positive and significant relation between downloads is observed.
However, in the TW=2,3,4 models the relationship is negative implying a statistically
significant sales displacement relationship. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients
suggest a displacement elasticity of 0.15% for a 1% increase in downloads over the four
weeks prior to, and also including, the week of observation. As discussed below, these
results are quantitatively consistent with the (dynamic stock) daily model reported above.
17Even in the absence of a release gap, torrent sites sometimes feature leaked studio copies of titles
which may have been intended for promotional reasons or award consideration. This means that it is
possible for illegal downloading to occur prior to official international (as well as domestic Australian)
release.
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Forward Looking Dynamic Stock of Downloads
It has been argued that the dynamic stock approach to considering future sales displace-
ment is more realistic than a contemporaneous approach. It might also be possible,
however, that an individual forgoes cinema attendance today by making a decision to
download the title at some point in the future. Obviously, this argument relies on the
title being available for download and that the intention is actually carried out. To test
whether downloaders forgo theatrical consumption prior to actually downloading the file,
we consider a simple modification of our previously specified dynamic model (2) in which
T is now forward looking. We denote this forward looking dynamic stock as T F and
consider the horizons T F=7,14,21,28.
As Table 9 demonstrates, the estimated coefficients on the (log) downloads variable
across all specifications (T F=1,7,14,21,28) remains positive implying no displacement ef-
fect. Taken with the evidence of the (backward looking) dynamic stock model, this might
suggest individuals who partake in downloading (and substitute it for paid cinematic con-
sumption) are time impatient and seek out films on torrent sites early in their theatrical
life—often prior to the official release if the film has already been released overseas as
discussed above.18 This observation is also consistent with the ‘movie-maven’ subculture
among (particularly young and tech savvy) consumers who desire to see a film early and
before the masses.
Sales Displacement Effects
Although we have detected a negative impact from file-sharing on box office sales in this
study, the magnitudes are relatively small. The results do permit us to calculate some
‘back-of-the-envelope’ numbers concerning the potential cost of piracy. If we focus on the
daily T=7,14,21,28 models, we observe sales displacement elasticities of 0.06, 0.16, 0.24
and 0.30, respectively. Given the median daily box office of films in our sample is A$3,593
(Table 3), this translates to a reduction in revenue of between A$2.19 and A$10.85,
or between 0.19 and 0.84 people assuming an average ticket price of A$12.87 (Screen
Australia reported average ticket price for 2011), for a 1% increase in downloading activity
across these time horizons. Given that state/territory level median number of downloads
over one, two, three and four weeks are 680, 1345, 1962 and 2485 (adjusting for Peer
Media Technology’s estimate of a 55% market coverage), this suggests that somewhere
between 29 and 40 downloads displaces one purchased ticket each day depending upon
which model is considered.
When considering the opening week and weekly models, we find similar levels of dis-
placement for the weekly model but also find more serious levels of sales displacement
for opening week revenues. Given the range of elasticities from Table 7, and the median
opening week daily revenue of A$31,046, we estimate a 1% increase in downloads dis-
places between one and three paid admissions. With the range of the median number
of downloads between 67 (contemporaneous model) and 725 (T=28), these levels imply
18In some sense the industry’s practice of pre-release TV advertising may be contributing to this
problem if consumer interest is aroused by trailers and the torrent file has already appeared on P2P
networks.
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that anywhere from 0.6 to 2.9 downloads displaces one paid admission—which appears
relatively high—but in terms of economic significance, the overall potential effect is low
because of the low levels of downloading actually taking place. In part this is reflective
of the large number of films with simultaneous releases in the US and Australian market,
but it is apparent that the longer a film’s release is delayed between the two markets, the
more likely the title is to appear on torrent sites which in turn increases the number of
illegal downloads.
In terms of the weekly model’s results of Table 8, and given the median weekly revenue
of A$17,527, the estimated displacement for T=2,3 and 4 (weeks) suggest between six and
eight downloads displaces one paid admission over a weekly time horizon. This finding
is comparable to the daily model where it took between 29 and 40 downloads over the
various windows considered to displace a sale on a given day. In the weekly model, we
are observing approximately the same time frame for downloads but now a week for
revenue/admissions. This explains why it now only takes five or six (i.e. daily finding
divided by seven) to displace one paid admission in a week.
If, as many industry reports implicitly suggest, one download displaces one paid ad-
mission then the lost revenue of the median film in is in the order of A$1.3m (assuming
median downloads of 100,000—see Table 4), or about 17.5%. The largest displacement
result came from the opening week model in which our estimates suggest that as few as
0.6 downloads could displace one paid admission. However, the economic significance of
this displacement is small because median downloads are relatively low for the opening
week and associated windows we observe prior to the opening week.
7 Conclusion
This study has investigated digital piracy in the context of the Australian theatrical film
industry. We find evidence of a sales displacement effect from illegal downloading on
box office revenues. However, our estimates suggest (at least at present) the economic
magnitude of this effect is small. One particular issue our study sheds light on is that
piracy behaviour increases proportionally to the release gap between the US and Aus-
tralian markets. Opening week revenues were shown to decline significantly because of
downloads which occurred prior to the theatrical release. This finding is not unsurpris-
ing and provides partial explanation for the observed and growing trend of day-and-date
world-wide releases—particularly for blockbuster titles.
Whether the theatrical film industry is likely to suffer revenue declines similar to
those observed in the music industry is yet to be seen. Certainly there are key differences
between the two industries which are important such as the relatively large size of film files
relative to music files, as well as the extent to which a download provides a substitute with
the social experience of cinematic consumption. Also, over the time-frame of our study,
Australian broadband internet plans and speeds were often restrictive for downloading
films but this will change dramatically in the very near future—especially with the roll-
out of the National Broadband Network (NBN).
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Table 1: Film Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Total revenue (AUD) 166 8,869,875 6,121,475 9,310,205 559 50,800,000
Total downloads 166 112,971 99,622 63,364 2,816 435,176
Filesize (MB) 166 1,200 1,320 408 637 3,470
Budget (USm) 166 70.3 50.0 56.4 1.5 260.0
Aus opening weekend screens 166 259 242 135 2 758
US opening weekend theatres 166 3,125 3,045 511 2,012 4,468
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Table 4: Regression Results — Contemporaneous Downloads
log(Revenue) GMM
OLS OLS 1st stage 2nd stage
log(Dowloads) 0.150*** 0.074*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Fed court decision dummy -0.118***
(0.019)
Full court decision dummy 0.030***
(0.008)
log(Downloads other states) 0.958***
(0.003)
log(Theatres) 1.416*** 1.103*** 0.031*** 1.100***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Week-of-run -0.083*** -0.222*** 0.016*** -0.224***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Day-of-week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Film FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Under Identified 6967.1
(P-Value) (0.000)
Weakly Identified 46643.1
(P-Value) (0.000)
Over Identified 186.4
(P-Value) (0.000)
N 56663 56663 56663 56663
R2 0.846 0.891 0.942 0.891
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two tailed
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7: Regression Results — Opening Week Revenues
log(Revenue) GMM 2nd stage
Contemp. 7 days 14 days 21 days 28 days
log(DowloadsT ) -0.048*** -0.125*** -0.114*** -0.106*** -0.103***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
log(Theatres) 0.986*** 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.999*** 0.997***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Day-of-week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Film FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7429 7429 7429 7429 7429
R2 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two tailed
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 8: Regression Results — Weekly Model
log(RevenueW ) GMM 2nd stage
Contemp. 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks
log(DowloadsTW ) 0.295*** 0.047** -0.073*** -0.128*** -0.150***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
log(TheatresW (max)) 0.973*** 1.004*** 1.014*** 1.015*** 1.011***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Week-of-run -0.271*** -0.280*** -0.277*** -0.273*** -0.270***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Film FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9228 9228 9228 9228 9228
R2 0.910 0.899 0.898 0.899 0.899
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two tailed
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
26
Table 9: Regression Results — Forward Dynamic Stock Model
log(Revenue) GMM 2nd stage
Contemp. 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks
log(DowloadsT F ) 0.032*** 0.100** 0.141*** 0.168*** 0.181***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
log(Theatres) 1.100*** 1.101*** 1.103*** 1.103*** 1.104***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Week-of-run -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.220***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Day-of-week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Film FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 56663 56663 56663 56663 56663
R2 0.891 0.899 0.892 0.892 0.892
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two tailed
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Figure 2: Total Revenues vs. Total Downloads (N=166)
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